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Horizontal Equity:
Measures in Search of a Principle
ABSTRACT
Horizontal equity ——thecommand that equals be treated equally ——has
received increased attention, particularly in attempts to measure the
desirability of tax reform proposals. This paper questions whether the
normative foundations for horizontal equity justify the indexes and
approaches that have generally been adopted. It suggests that past attempts
to implement horizontal equity are inconsistent with its supposed foundations
and that more thorough examination of the concept raises serious doubts as to
whether any alternative interpretation of horizontal equity reasonably




Cambridge, MA 021381. INTRODU cr101
Horizontalequity (HE) is the command that equals be treated equally. HE
istypically said tobeviolated by reforms that treat pre-reform equals
unequally or that alter the pre—reform rankings of individuals by income or
utility levels. The concept of HE frequently arises in discussions of tax
policy1alongside the more frequently discussed concerns for equality——
denominatedasvertical equity (yE) ——andefficiency.The structure of
analysis is that each ofthe three criteria has independent significance and
must in some way be balanced against the others.[See Atkinson (1980),
Feldatein (1976a, 1976b), King (1983).]
Twofamiliarexamples illustrate the typical application of HE. A direct
affront to HE is often seen to be created by a random tax ——forexample, a
taximposed on one—half of each group in the population at twice what the tax
rateswouldotherwisehave been. Another common example would be repealing
theincome tax exemption for interest on municipal bonds.The affront is
somewhat less direct, but nonetheless clear ——repealdecreases the value of
municipal bonds,2 with the result that taxpayers' positions depend on whether
theywere sufficiently fortunate to have avoided investing in municipal bonds
1. This emphasis is somewhat curious in that nothing about the basic
definitionof HE limitsitsapplication to tax reforms, rather than all
government action.Perhaps it is because VE is most often expressly
addressed in the study of taxation that HE has been considered there as well.
2. This also increases value of other bonds, andotherassets more generally
——allthisassuming no grandfathering, etc.
—1—prior to the reform.3
Despite HE being mentioned In the same breath as VE in Musgrave's (1959)
pioneering treatise on public finance, HE has generally been the step—child
of thethree concerns. In the past decade, however,there has been a growing
interestin the concept.An often—cited article by Feldstein (1976a)
exploring HE in the context of tax reform, joined by an article by Musgrave
(1976)that explores all threeevaluative criteria, has led the way.
Additionalwork such as that by Brennan (1971), King (1983), Plotnick (1981,
1982, 1984), and Rosen (1978) has focused primarily on refining the
measurement of HE.
Thisrise in prominence may seem surprising since HE is directly in
conflictwith the social welfare tradition, whereas VE and efficiency are
Includedwithin it. The thesis of this paper is that this recent work has in
an important sense jumped the gun. HE is now frequently measured and applied
even though there has been virtually no exploration of why one would care
about HE in the first place.Although the notion of equal treatment of
equalsiS hardly new,itgenerallyhas been analyzed andadvocatedin
contextsthatbear little resemblance to those in which HE is now being
avidly discussed. Most papersconsideringHE eitherignore the question of
its justification altogether or offer only the briefest remarks, supported by
3. Those at the break—even bracket for investment in municipal bonds
presumably were indifferent between municipal and, for example, corporate
bonds, and will be affected by the reform in proportion to their investment
in the former.Moreover, Investors who were just below the break—even
bracket presumably avoided municipal bonds altogether whereas investors just
above the break—even bracket placed most (or all) of the bond portion of
their portfolio in municipals. These latter groups relative positions are
reversed by the reform.
—2—little more than a few citations to the equally brief remarks of others on
the subject. This stands in sharp contrast to yE, which has been explored in
precisely the relevant context for centuries at a minimum,andefficiency,
which, despite its more recent tradition, has been given considerable direct
attention.
This lacuna concerning the normative justification for the concept of HE
creates two problems. First and most obvious, the efforts directed toward
applying the concept are at best a wasted effort if there is no normative
basis for concern, and at worst will lead policymakers astray when they are
encouraged to sacrifice other values in the pursuit of HE. Second, it is
rather difficult to develop precise measures for a concept and methods for
weighing it along with other objectives when it is not well understood what
is being measured. As Sen (1973, p. 3) has noted in a related context: "Even
if we take inequality as an objective notion, our interest in its measurement
mustrelate to ournormativeconcern with it, andin judging the relative
meritsof different objective measures of inequality, it wouldindeed be
relevant to introduce normative considerations." This paper argues that much
of past work on HE suffers from the second problem and that further study of
the first reveals that the entire enterprise, at least in its current form,
may be altogether misguided.
Section 2 demonstrates how traditional definitions and recently offered
indexes of HE raise serious difficulties even before considering the deeper
issues concerning the normative status of HE. Section 3 assesses the extent
to which the persuasive force often thought to support invocations of HE can
be understood better in the traditional social welfare framework that the
—3—concept of HE attempts, at least in part, to reject. This discussion will
alli one to assess the truth of the assertion by Feldstein (1976a) and Rosen
(1978)that the traditional utilitarian/SWF approach offers no procedure for
factoring considerations of HE into theanalysis [see alsoAtkinson and
Stiglitz (1980, p. 355)] and to determine whether this claimindicatesa
weakness in the traditional approach or in the concept of HE itself. In the
process,the connection between HE and VEfirst emphasizedby Musgrave will
be explored, and the analysis of HE will also be extended to considet its
connection with the study of risk. Section iexploreswhether the concept of
HEcan be rescued either by attributing normative significance to the status
quo distribution or by reference to other intrinsic theories of justice. It
will be argued that direct normativedefense ofthe status quo is most
difficultand that reliance on othertheories of justicemay be defensible
but is insufficient to justify the concept of HE as it has generally come to
be understood. Concluding remarks assess the residual usefulness of HE in
light of this criticism.
2. DEFINITIONS & INDRTR$ OF HORIZONTAL UITY
Itseems backwards to criticize definitions and indexes of HE before
exploring the motivation for the concept.Stiglitz (1982, p. 28 n.23) has
aptly characterized some past studies as "ad hoc approaches defining an index
of horizontal inequity and an index of vertical equity, and positing a social
welfare function giving trade—offs between the two[, which] seems close to
assuming what is to be analyzed." And Sen (1973, pp. 506) has noted that "a
—1—measure can hardly be more precise than the concept it represents." Yet
closer analysis suggests, surprisingly enough, that traditional definitions
of HE are fundamentally problematic, and that HE indexes do not follow from
these definitions and are almost certainly inconsistent with virtually any
reasonable normative basis for HE one can imagine.
2.1 Problems with SimDle Definitions of Horizontal Eauity
Most generally, and most commonly, HE is said to require the equal
treatmentofequals.[Musgrave (1959, p. 160;1976, p.1),Atkinsonand
Stiglitz,1980, p. 353.) Mostoftencited is Feldstein's definition (1976a,
p. 95) of HE for evaluating tax reform: "if twoindividualswould have the
same utility level if the tax remained unchanged, they shouldalsohave the
sameutilitylevel if the tax is changed." In contrast, VE callsforan
appropriate pattern of differentiation (inequality in treatment) among people
who are not equals.[See Musgrave (1959), Musgrave (1976), Musgrave and
Musgrave (1973).)
Equal treatment by itself is an insufficient guideline.First, it
provides no measure at allofthe degree to which HE is violated by any
action.Second, it only has application to precise equals, which is highly
incomplete; for example, it provides no information whatsoever if no two
individuals are exactly alike.Third, even an infinitesimal difference in
treatment is sufficient to increment such a measure, and any further
deviations, no matter howsignificant,are ignored.Thus, once it is
recognized that virtually alleffectsof any action areon individuals who
—5—are at least somewhat unequal ——eitherinitially or after an infinitesimal
change ——itappears that HE simply has nothing more to say.All further
analysis is by definition in the realm of yE, which addresses the appropriate
treatment of unequals.One might have expected HE to have vanished from
discussionsby economists, who are accustomed to ignoring sets of events of
measure zero and to assuming, at least a priori, that most phenomena ——
particularlyobjective functions ——behavein a continuous manner.5
ILSchmalensee(1981) accepts half of this argument.He admits that his
measure of horizontal inequity is zero if no two individuals are exactly
alike,yetattributes significance to the magnitude of inequality in
treatment among those who are identical, and insists that this magnitude is
of a different normative order than similardifferencesarising between
individuals who initially aredifferent,regardless of howsmall thatinitial
difference might be.
5. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980,pp. 353,355,391) suggest that imposing HE
as aconstraint that cannot be violated in reaching other objectives may in
factbe the most appealing interpretation of HE. First, their reason ——that
it wholly avoids interpersonal utility comparisons ——amountsto the
selection of one normative principle over others totally on the basis of ease
ofmeasurement: it neither indicates anyreasonwhy the interpretation is
normatively appealing or why modifications of it are not.Second, this
lexicographic preference, in addition to being subject to the criticism
developed below, has little intuitive appeal in that it seems implausible
that the slightest inequality in treatment of status quo equals would be
thoughtmore important than even substantial gains inoverall welfare levels,
including to the two individuals treated unequally, and significant
improvements in equality or other objectives. Similarly, this lexicographic
approach would accord no weight to inequitable treatment of whatever
magnitude to individuals that were not precise equalsin thestatus quo.
These latter argumentsarethe direct analogues of the argumentsof this
Sectionthat the simple commands of equal treatmentor to avoid order
reversalsare in themselves of little use because they do not translate into
a meaningfulmeasureof the degree of inequity that results from anygiven
reform.Finally, Atkinson and Stiglitz seemunaware that many typical reform
proposalsinevitably involve at least some violation of HE, as later examples
will demonstrate ——and,admittingvarious differences among individuals [see
Feldstein(1976a, pp. 87—89)] orunavoidable administrative error, this would
be true of all reforms.Their proposed interpretationof HE, therefore,
virtuallyforbids reform, and the prohibition holds regardless of any
conceivable benefits a reform might offer.
Interpreting HE as a side constraint may have some force in terms of
—6—2.2 Failures of }dified Definitions and Indexes of Horizontal Equity
Instead of dying out almost completely, the concept of HE has gained new
prominance in recent work in public finance, particularly in studying tax
reform. The implicit assumption has essentially been that there is something
worth measuring, although what is being measured typically can be seen only
by examing the conclusion of the analysis ——i.e.,the index itself.Any
such implicit concept will, of course, reflect some value judnent concerning
the proper treatment of unequals. One of the most common approaches is to
offer measures counting the number of order reversals or relying on the rank
correlation between the pre— and post-reform distribution.[See Atkinson
(1980), King (1983), Plotnick (1982,198'), and Rosen (1978); also noted by
Feldstein (1976a).] These elaborations, however, aresubjectto virtually
thesame oriticiam asthe initial definition: minute movements leading to
cross—overscount in full and substantial movements resulting in no
crosS—over are ignored.°
prohibiting arbitrary discrimination, for example among individuals of different race or having differenteyecolor.[See Musgrave (1976).]
Affirmative justification for such an approach would probably rest on
assumptions concerning the fallibility of human institutions,since
nondiscrimination would typically be implied by social welfare maximization
in any event. The critique that the side constraint imposes an unjustifiable
lexicographicordering and that the constraint is generally violated by
making virtually anyreformwould be less powerfulsincethe constraint would
typicallybe satisfiedin such cases at no ——orlittle ——costin social
welfare.It is the application of theside constraint approach to any
changesin income or wealth resulting directly or indirectly from changes in
government policy that leads to crippling implications.
6. Part of this probln has been noted by Plotnick (1982, p. 383) and Rosen
(1978,p. 315 & n.16). Yet Rosen's distance—sensitive measure (p. 315) has
—7—The basic problem is that these measures do not vary continuously with
the magnitude of the effect on each individual (or groups of individuals). A
concreteexample is King's (1983) index which, although distance—sensitive,
fails to overcome this problem due to its continued reliance on rerankings.
He measures affronts to HE by using a scaled order statistic (si) for each
individual, defined as follows:
=_________ I y
wherey and denote, respectively,"the Post income levels
correspondingto the rank of individual j in the ex ante and expost
distributions," and y. denotes the mean income.This measure has some
remarkable properties that are not noted by King.First, consider two
individuals, A and B, such that A has one cent more income in the ex ante
income distribution than B, but two times the income of B in the ex post
income distribution. Since there is no rank reversal, 5A =
8B
=0.Contrast
this with the same situation,except that in the ex ante distribution, A has
one cent less than B rather than one centmore.Now, 5A =8B
=.67! This
largejump (in a two-person example, the maximumvalueof the indicator is 2)
demonstrateshow his proposed indicator is discontinuous in ex ante income
levels.Moreover, it should be clear that, except at the point of the
some bizarreproperties ——forexample, a complete reversal in the income
distributionregisters no loss in HE. Essentially, only the absolute value
of the distances, measured before and after the reform, not the total change
in distance, is used; his approach sharply differs from a direct distance
measure when there are crossovers.Moreover, in connection with the
discussion to come in subsection 3.1, it is interesting to note that Rosen's
index has the general property that the loss in HE increases as the paired
individuals in his index are moved closer together, but decreases as they are
moved further apart (untilthey are as farapart as initially), which is
almost exactly an inverse of the measure of the effect of a reform on yE.
—8—discontinuity, the indicator is totally unaffected by ex ante income levels.
Therefore, the derivative of the indicator with respect to changes in the ex
ante income level of A, holding constant the income of B, is always either
zeroor infinity. The indicator also has surprising properties in terms of
changes in ex post income levels. Until there is a cross—over, 5A3B =
Afterthe cross—over, the Si's increase smoothly as the gap in income
increases.The latter is not surprising, but the discontinuity in the
derivative at the cross—over point (the derivative jumps from zero to a
strictly positive number) is hard to reconcile with any persuasive equitable
intuitionsIcan imagine.7 In various ways, the analysis and indexes of many
others have reflected a very similar approach.8 It is hard to conceive of
7. It is also worth noting how these properties might be interpreted.
Essentially, negative weight is only attached to any "overshooting," i.e.,
movements apart after the reform has reached the point of equality in ex post
income. This might be viewed as a sort of VE measure since, as will be
discussed in subsection3.1, HE andVE give the same indications when
individuals are moved further apart in the distribution. This does not fully
hold, however, since movement apart absent a cross-over is ignored by King's
index, and the index also places no beneficial weight on movements together
up to the cross-over point.
8. For example, Feldstein (1976a,p.82) simply asserts that "the
introductionof a tax should not alter the ordering of individuals by utility
level" (emphasis added) and later criticizes one possible measure of order
reversalsbecause it "would be distorted ...ifthe utilities were altered by
a nonlinear function" that preserved ranking perfectly, not noticing the
somewhat bizarre judnents implicit in such criticism. Feldstein's implicit
defense of a discontinuous index is most surprising in light of his criticism
(1976a, p. 81) of Rawis' (1971) difference principle on the basis of its
discontinuity.
Plotnickexplicitly advocates the need for distance measures (1982, p. 383 &
n.17,p. 388;1981, p. 5).But elsewhere, Plotniok (1981, n.7) explicitly states that: "Useful measures will jbeconcerned between initial and
actualfinal levels of well—being,nor between initialand final
rank-preserving levels. These comparisons may also be of interest, but they
are not appropriate for assessing horizontal inequity." [See also (1981, p.
11).] His articles never resolve this tension. Four of the five indexes
Plotniok (1981) examines exhibit precisely the character of King's index.
—9—the normative intuition that could justify such measures.
2.3 Inconsistency Between Horizontal Ecuity and Concerns
forEconomic Mobility
This subsection explores economic mobility (MOB) because the striking
contrast between prior analysis of this concept and of HE reinforces the
argumentspreviously developed concerning the weaknesses of the conceptual
foundations of HE.Despite the substantial sophistication devoted to
measuring MOB, little attention has been given towhy we care about the
concept in the first place ——aproblem emphasized in Shorrocks' (1978)
investigation. MOB has been said to be valued for a variety of reasons;
these must bedistinguished because each implies different definitions and
measures.The most relevant interpretation,9 offered by Atkinson (1981),
The fifth, based on the Spearman rankcorrelationcoefficient, takes no
account of distance, which Plotnick agrees makes it less satisfactory.
9. There exist others as well. MOBmaybe desired because, as stated by
Atkinson (1981), "it is instrumental in leading to greater efficiency." From
this perspective, MOB is primarily seen as a symptomofa freely functioning
economyor as a policy instrument that can be directly manipulated
(increased) in order to improve the efficiency of the economy, either
interpretation being wholly consistent with the traditional social welfare
framework and thus of no further interest here.This should be contrasted
with a decision to place intrinsic value on greaterequality of opportunity.
Of course, observed MOB would only be a symptomofsuch equality, as MOB can
also be generated, for example, by arbitrary fiat or random events, neither
ofwhich would indicatethat opportunities are more equalinthe relevant
sense.This interpretation of MOB, therefore, calls more for a direct
evaluation ofthe processes by which individuals'positions are endogenously
determinedbefore and after a reform, rather than measurementof the actual
changein welfare positions directly resulting from a reform. In particular,
equalopportunityin thissensecan be understood as a preference for
equality in ex ante positions, where ex ante refers not to before a
particular reform, but to before the processes permitted as a result of any
—10—would simply consider MOB to be a good thing in its own right. Basically,
this view of MOB is simply the mirror image to traditional notions of HE:
change from the status quo Is preferred for its ownsake.It turns out that
many past attempts to examine MOB more precisely have implicitly adopted this
characterization: measures simply capture changes from the statusquo
distribution, which are assumed to be desirable.
The most obvious, yet most startling point is simply that, undera
variety of interpretations, HE andMOBaredirectopposites. The simple
example of a reform that gives everyone an equal probability of taking the
position of anyindividualin the income distrubution Is a massive affront to
HE and,atthe same time, the maximumpossibledegree of MOB (according to
some measures). This oppojtjon canbeseen most clearly by examining King's
article (1980,1983) entitled "An Index of Inequality: With Applications to
Horizontal Equity and Social Mobility." In one section, he offers and
explores a particular index for HE. In the next, he claims (1983, p. 108) to
overcome prior difficulties in developing a satisfactory index f or MOB by
constructing "a normative index alongthelines pursued above[i.e., in
developingan index for HE]. The only diffeence is that it is usualinthe
contextof social mobility to favor changes in the ordering of the
distribution.... isnowanirioreasin function of .."Thus,he simply
adopts hisHE index as his MOBindex,just changing the direction of the
effect.[Compare conditions 1—3 (1983,pp. 105—06) with conditions 1'—3' (p.
reforms have produced an actual outcome for different individuals.
Similarly, MOB canbeinterpreted as a dynamic analogue to yE, the idea being
that the greater the movement within the income distribution over an
individual'slifetime, the more likely highs and lows average out in some
manner.
—11—109); equation 23 with equation 30; and Theorem 2 with Theorem 3.]Ifhe had
attempted to combine yE, HE, andMOBinto his total equity index allatthe
sametime, the HE and MOB terms would collapse into each other.
This connection is notas apparent as itmight be because King discusses
VE and HE in one section, and pairs VE and MOB in the next. Immediately
thereafter, he uses his approach to consider optima). taxationandoffers an
empirical application of his indexes;inboth instances he measures overall
inequity by using his combined index of VE and HE, making absolutely no
comment indicating why the just—derived MOB index has been left out of' the
computation.[See King (1983,pp. 109—11, ui_hO.] King's conclusion (p.
hlii)suggests that hisproposed index allows "horizontal equity .r.social
mobilityto be taken into account," although the comment is made in passing,
with no emphasis on the importance andexclusive nature of the "or" in
avoiding normative contradiction.'0
The ideathat there is someconnection between HE and MOB has not gone
unnoticedby others. For example, Atkinson's exploration of HE (1980, p. 5)
notes that thequestion of "how much 'mobility' is induced by taxation" is
"related to the concept of horizontal equity." Atkinson (1981) also has
writtenseparately on the questionof MOB; there MOB is taken to be desirable
whereashisHE study (1980) takes such mobility to beundesirable)
10.In addition, Kingnotesthe partialcongruence of MOB and yE, but fails
to note the direct corollary concerning the conflict, to be explored in
subsection3.1, between VE and the component of HE that addresses movements
together.
11. He uses the samesort of mobility matrix inboth articles to help
summarize mobility effects.
—12—Plotnick (1982), in one of his works on HE, does offer some suggestion that
MOB violates HE.In another(1981), he explicitly uses a Gini
coefficient/Lorenzcurveapproach to measure HE, which has been previously
understoodby those who study income inequality as measuring MOB.12
But the idea that those writing about HE and those writing about MOB were
writing the same things, just switching signs whenever switching terminology,
seems to have rnained quite far from sight. Yet this connection between MOB
and HE measures should hardly be surprising if some of the simplest
motivations for the two concepts arise, respectively, from the ad hoc
assumptionof socialpreferences for and againstchanges from the status quo
distribution. Thissuggeststhat all who use one measure or the other when
evaluatingproposed reforms are implicitly advocating one of these
preferences at the expense of the other, although this underlying value
choice typically rmnains hidden.
2.Z Toward a Working Definition of Horizontal Eauity
Resurrecting HE ——evenafter redefining it to refer to the treatment of
unequals —-requiresat a minimum an index with prima fade plausibility. I
will assume that any reasonable measure will in some way reflect the number
of individuals affected, weighted by the degree of the effect (i.e., distance
12. In addition, as withHE (see subsection 3.2below), !B indexes have
previouslybeen linked to measures of probability distributions and
dispersion.[See Atkinson (1981).] Given that MOB andHEindexes are often
one in the same (except for their sign),thisconnection shouldnotbe
surprisingin light of the preceding analysis.
—13—of movement). The following is one such example:
1HE = —pi'pj2'
where y,and refer to the incomes of individuals j and .j.
before(ante) and after(post) a ref orin.This measure ss the change in
distance separating allpairsof individuals.13 The following discussion can
be simplified by analyzing the five ways a pair of individuals can be
affected by a reform:
1.They can move further apart (ifinitially unequal).
2.They can moveclosertogether (still remainingunequal).
3.They can move apart from aninitially equal position.
IL Theycan movetogether, ending at an equal position.
5. They can beginapart,cross over, and endup apart.
First,possibility 5 is simplythe combination of others (k and3).
Second, there seems to be no compelling reason to attachmuchsignificance to
3 or asdistinguished from 1or 2, sincethelatter pair encompass the
formerexcept for an infinitesimal movement either at the beginning or the
13. One could weightthe indexby the inverse of the population to compare
relativeinequality among societies of differing sizes. It may be noted that
the expression for 'HE includes the terms for wherei:j, but since those
termsequal zero, they can be ignored.
1k. This is not to say that any particular measure will be separable In that
eachofthe two movements can be weighed without regard to the magnitude of
theother. Rather, my claim is that the character of the measure ——i.e.,
whether a movement is good or bad and why ——ininstance 5 can be understood
from how one evaluates instances 3 and II.
—111—end.This reinterpretation of HE suggests, therefore, that no particular
significance is attached either to starting or ending at precise equality, or
to the cross—over point itself.Finally, attaching negative weight to
movements in both directions is central to HE.Since unequal treatment of
equals most clearly violates HE, moving apart (1 or 3)mustbe registered by
any HE index.But if HE were limited to being an objection to moving
individuals further apart, it would solely be an objection to increased
inequality ——i.e.,it merely would be an aspect of yE; hence, moving
together (2 or 14) is also assumed to violate HE ——acharacterization
directly contrary to yE.
3.BORIZONTALUITT AND ThE VFARIST APPROA(
Feldstein (1976a, p. 82) has stated that "equal taxation of equals is
implied directly by utilitarianism and does not require a separate principle
of horizontal equity" when all individuals are assumed to have the same
prererences. [See also Atkinson and Stiglitz(1980, p.3514), Stiglitz (1982,
p. 3).3 ThisIs generally true because, for example, in the case of random
taxation, it would often be better to apply the average tax rate to pre-tax
equals sincegreater equality in thefinal distribution of income will yield
higher social welfarebecause the marginal utility of income is assumed to be
declining.'5To the extent that HE is simply a by—product of social welfare
15.Also,sinceadverse incentive effects are typically nonlinear,thereare
additional reasons to prefer equal treatment at average levels.
Exceptions to this general proposition due to diversities in tastes [see
—15—maximization, the concept can be wholly abandonded as redundant. Giving HE
operational content is thus in direct conflict with the social welfare
traditiorl.16This Section argues, however,that much of the intuitive force
behind past considerations of HE is already accounted for ina traditional
SWF.
Feldstein (1976a, p. 82), Muagrave (1976,pp. 13—1k)], offsetting the
incentive to substitute labor for liesure[see Weiss(1976)],or
nonconvexities in the feasible set [see Stiglitz (1982)) need not detain us
here.
16. Technically, HE can be seen as violating the social welfare tradition in
twoways. First, itintroduces nonwelfare information [see Sen (1977)] —in
thiscase distributional positions in a state(the status quo) other than the
one being evaluated. (In social choice discussions, this would be termed a
violation of the anonymity condition.)Second, as discussed in a later
footnote, increases in an individual's welfare, ceteris paribus, can reduce
social welfare.Analysis in Section 11 suggests, moreover, that existing
conceptions of HE also seem inconsistent with the notion of optimization more
generally.
This conflict is important only if maximizing social welfare can readily
violate HE, but this is often the case. For example, purely random taxes can
be avoided, but some randomness due to imperfect enforcement or mistakes in
administration is unavoidable, and often significant.In the example
involving repeal of the municipal bondinterest exemption, equaltreatment of
equals is simply impossible without a complex compensation or grandfathering
scheme, which for the present will be assumed to be prohibitively costly.
(More generally, the issue arises so long as perfect compensation involves
some cost, for then it would be necessary to consider the magnitude of the HE
violation and the weight to be attributed to HE in order to determine whether
the compensation was justified.) The problem is that, operating within the
relevantstatus quo for Feldstein's definition, "equals" will not necessarily
have behaved identically. And if one expands to broader definitions of HE
encompassing order reversals or adistance measure, it is clear that even if
equalshad behaved identically, some loss in HE would be unavoidableifthe
interest exemption were to be repealed. A multitude of reforms have this
character. See also note 15.
—16—3.1 Horizontal Equity as an Implicit Appeal to Vertical Eaujtv
Feldstein's (1976a) major example illustrates howHEcollapses into the
traditional social welfare framework. He considers a tax reform that imposes
costs in terms of HEasfollows: 1000 taxpayers gain $10 each, at a cost of
$1000to each of 9 taxpayers (a net gain of $1000, but the losses are
concentrated).Alltaxpayersbegin withequal incomes and have identical
utilityfunctions. He demonstrates that the unequal treatment offsets part
of the benefit of the reform, and that the greater the rate at which the
marginal utility of income declines and the lower the initial level of
income, the less desirable is the reform (and the more desirable is its
postponement).But this result is alltoofamiliar: the reform increases
aggregrate income but causes inequality in the distribution.A utilitarian
SWF is sensitive to income inequality in the manner Feldstein's example
illustrates: the greater the loss in welfare due to the resulting inequality,
the less desirable the reform.The only difference is that we generally
refer to this effect under the rubric of yE, not HE.17
17.This exampleisinterpreted further in Section 3.2asillustrating the
imposition of risk. It will then be argued that both these interpretations
are interchangeable since both arisefromthe assumed concavity of the
utility function.Feldstein (1976a,pp. 100—101) claims that "[t]he
concavity of the utility functions together with the assumption that everyone
should be treated as if they had the sameutilityfunction and the same
initial income imply that the optimal tax change may be naller than if
horizontal equity isignored." The important point here is that concavity
aloneis what drives his conclusion ——i.e.,the concept of HE is
superfluous.To prove that it is a necessary condition,simplyconsider(1)
where utility functions are linear, in which case his social welfare measure
simply reflects the net gainof$1000, independent of the distribution, and
—17—Note that in this example the choice of the status quo ——whichis the
centerpiece of most definitions of HE, including Feldstein's ——isclearly
irrelevantto the comparative evaluation of the two states.In particular,
ifone considered the unequal state as the status quo and imagined moving
back to what was originally considered to be the initial state, the SWF
approach would lead to the same evaluation of each state ——whichis what it
means for the status quo to be irrelevant. Yet movement in either direction
equally offends HE using the index 'HE offered above, and similar indications
would follow from other definitions if his example were modified even
siightly.18This suggests that the persuasive force behind Feldstein's
example is captured in the standard social welfare framework whereas his
(2) where utility functions are convex, in which case the unequal treatment
actually would improve welfare under his measure.Concavity will often be
sufficient as well, for even if individuals had different initial incomes
and/or different utility functions, the unequal incidence would in general
lower social welfare. The exception would be where the losers happened to be
those with the lowest marginal utility of income and the gainers those with
the highest ——whichtypically would be a redistribution effect from the rich
to the poor. But that is precisely what VE is all about. The assumption
that all should be treated as if they have the same utility function is
usually justified either as an approximation f or an unmeasuraable reality or
as dictated by egalitarian principles, which are directly linked to
economist's references to yE. The "as if same initial income" assumption is
discussed further toward the end of this subsection.
Yet, in addition to the fact that this equal income assumption does not
really drive the analysis, I believe that it is also the case that the
assumption is wholly unwarranted, particularly in the context of tax policy.
Feldstein' s argument that, for example, courts often ignore unequal income
(1) seemsbesidethe point for tax policy, whichis explicitlyconcerned with
theallocation of tax burden according to income level; (2) is not wholly
true, e.g., damage awards do reflect the income level of the victim; and, (3)
where true, is typically capable of independent justification ——ignoringthe
income level of the injurer is often supported by administrative concerns ——
or(Umaybe simply wrong.
18. Consider, for example, moving back to Feldstein's initial situation, but
overshooting by 1 cent for each person.There would be complete order
reversal between the two groups.
—18—definitions of HE are inconsistent both with that framowork and with his
example.HE would register a loss from implementing both changes
consecutively, while the '1F indicates no net effect.'9
Thisexample can begeneralizedasfollows.First, consider two
individualswho are moved further apart in the income distribution as a
result of a reform.'HE will register some loss, and the loss will vary
directly with the significance of the movement.Thus, the greater the
increase in inequality caused by the reform, the greater the loss in HE.
But, just as was the case with the initial discussion of Feldstein's example,
we again find that HE seems to be measuring just what we are accustomed to
considering under the guise of yE. HE and VE have the same sort of measure
(distance—related)2° for the same sortof change(movingapart) both
call it a badthing.
Next,consider two individuals who are moved closer together in the
19. Consider the well-known example in which there exist two groups of
individuals with different abilities.The utilitarian solution may well
entail a reversal in ranking from thepre—tax status quo. [SeeAtkinson and
Stiglitz(1980, sections 11—3 & 11il), Mirlees (1971), King (1983, pp.
99—100, 109—11).]AchievingVEin this example clearly affronts HE.
Plotniak(19811,pp. 115) advances the general argument that "[u]nless the
sociallyoptimal distributionis one of fullequality, thoseearning more
initialwell—being should surely have greater final well—being than those
earning less." Yet one might ask why the status quo distribution should be
given normative weight. Since it is assumed in the example that individuals
did not determine their own abilities, itseems no more unfairfor the less
able to be better off due to accident of birth than for the more able to be
better off due to the same accident. Theproblem of justifying normative
weightbeing attributed to the status quo is pursued further in subsection
11.1.
20.Both HE and VE could be interpreted as being concerned not with absolute
changes, but relative changes, measured for example by proportions relative
to themean. All the same analysiswould follow.
—19—income distribution as a result of a reform.Just as in the preceding
instance, our measure of HE will register some loss, and the loss will vary
directly with the significance of the movement.Thus, the greater the
increase in equality caused by the reform, the greater the loss in HE. We
again find that HE seems to be measuring just what we are accustomed to
considering under the guise of yE. HE and VE again have the same sort of
measure (distance—related) for the same sort of change (moving together).
Buthere, HE indicates that the equityimpact ofthe changeis negative
whereasVE indicates a positive evaluation. Section 11 will address whether
thereexist any apparent normative justifications for this implication of HE.
Quite frequently, examples offered to illustrate violations of HE begin
with the assumption that all individuals initially have equal incomes, as was
the case in Feldstein's illustration as well as those offered by others [see
Brennan (1971), Zodrow (1981)].21 This starting point is hardly surprising
given the frequent description of the HE concept as requiring equal treatment
of eQuals. The separation of changes into movements together and movements
apart, however, suggests that this set of examples has largely missed the
issue since by starting with all being equal, all movements are apart; hence,
22 HE yields the same verdict that VE would In any event.It is revealing
that those exploring HE, inattempting to motivate their analysis, have not
21.A modification with very similar effects is when the population is
divided into large groups, all perfectly equal within each, as is the case
with White and White (1965).
22. At most, HE can be said to give added weight to this preference, but when
there are no movements together being considered and no explicit formula
being offered to combine the HE juduents with other factors, the difference
in weighting has no operational significance.
—20—chosen examples involving increasing equality, which has been shown to be the
central application if HE is to have Independent significance.
3.2 Horizontal Equity as an ImDlicIt ApDeal to Risk Analysis
HE arguably could be reinterpreted as an expression of a concern for
avoiding the imposition of risk.Consider again the example of the random
tax. It is clear that the arbitrary unequal treatment of equals resulting
from a random tax is welfare reducing, even setting aside for the moment the
earlier argument that VE provides a basis for this conclusion.In
particular, the random tax can be compared with a certain tax on each group
that raises the same revenues. Both taxes produce the same expected income
in the post—reform state (and both raise the same revenue23), yet the random
tax isassociatedwith a lower expected utility precisely because of the risk
that is imposed.
Unlike the purely random tax, Feldstein's (1976a) example of the reform
producing benefits of $10 to most individuals but a loss of$1000to a few is
similar in its affects to many realistic reforms. Yet ittoocan be seen as
a gamble, the uncertainty being resolved at the point where particular
individuals know in which group they fall (just as a lottery is uncertain
until the winning numbers have been announced). Therefore itshouldcome as
nosurprise that Feldstein finds that he mustspecifythe degree of risk
23. A strictly random tax might not, but one can similarly imagine a tax that
israndom as to each individual but designed to raise a specified amount of
revenue overall.
—21—aversion (he assumes a constant RHA utility function as anapproximation)and
the level of ex ante income in order to evaluate the proposed reform and
various modifications thereof, just as must be done in quantifying the impact
on social welfareofimposing any risk. It might be argued that risk is not
really implicated here because it was clear from the beginning who the
gainers and losers would be.Yet if an earlier announcement had been made
describing the general distributional impact of the reform, but not
indicating who the gainers and losers would be, followed the next day-by a
revelation of the complete proposal, our judgement as to the equities or
impact on social welfare surely would be unchanged.Thus, most government
reforms, which have the characteristic that they impose both benefits and
losses, can be analogized, for example, to a change in climate that results
in substantial benefits but imposes significant losses through changes in
asset values.2 Whether imposed by the government, nature, or a casino,
there is risk all the same.The connection between risk from uncertainty
concerning future government policy and other sources of risk is the subject
of Kaplow (1985a, 1985b).
Inthis connection, it isworth noting that the statistical measure of
variance canbeused to describe the probability distribution that
characterizes an uncertainprospector asasummarystatasticto describe the
distributionof some attribute of a population ——e.g.,income ——afterthe
results of some event (even one not embodying any uncertainty) have been
experienced.The frequency interpretation of probability presents a
21. The closeness of the analogy is revealed by considering such a climate
changethat is within the government's control ——whichtechnology is making
more possible. Then the climate change would itself be a government reform.
—22—well—knownconnectionbetweenexanteuncertaintyandresulting
distributions.One can describe the relevant situations from either an ex
ante or ex post perspective without changing the underlying phenomenon ——the
former perspective is more in accord with risk analysis, the latter with
Previous discussions of HE contain a number of clues suggesting the
connection between HE and risk, although the claim that there is a direct
linkage has never, to my knowledge, been asserted.In addition to
Feldatein's use of the Arrow—Pratt measure of relative risk aversion, he also
sometimes talks of gambles and future risks (1976a, pp. 92—93). Similarly,
Rosen(1978,pp.315—16)and Stig].itz (1982) use a random tax as their
primary example. King (1983)notes that his HE index bears some resemblance
to a risk prnium. Hettich (1979, p. 696) uses a variance measure to capture
the loss in HE.Brennan's (1971) discussion of HE frequently refers to
variance andrelated characteristics of probability distributions, and the
arguments heuses to motivate his HE measure resemble those often used in
25. That the samephenomena canbe interpreted equallywellin terms of risk
or VE should hardly be surprising.At least in the utilitarian framework,
concernsfor VE traditionally have been justified by reference to the
decreasing marginal utility of income, which is precisely the source of risk
aversion. In fact, Haraanyi (1953, 1977) has modeled the VE issue by using
the methods of decisionmaking under uncertainty, taking as the starting point
a hypothetical situation in which individuals do not know which person they
will be in any possible social state.This framework suggests that each
would chose states by maximizing expected utility, implying unanimous
agreement upon the utilitarian criterion. In addition, Harsanyi (1955, 1977)
has shown that acceptance of the axioms for rational choice under uncertainty
for both social and individual preferences leads to the same conclusion. The
resulting utilitarian prescription concerning the appropriate measure for
evaluating VE is thus directly connected to the traditional formulation for
deci.sionmakingunder uncertainty. States with greater inequality (lower in
VE) areopposedbecause of the risk to each that they would be one of the
individuals at the low end of the income distribution.
—23—motivating statistical measures of dispersion.Moreover, he derives the
result that a government choosing among a variety of tax sources --eachof
which affronts HE to some degree ——willalways be best off usinga
combination of all of them, including those causing thegreatestaffront to
HE. Brennan fails to note, however, that this is precisely the well—known
diversification result of standard portfolio theory.In the end, however,
none of these authors comes close to suggesting that HE amounts to little
more than another way of talking about risk in a particular context.
It mightbeargued that this conclusion is of no great significance,
becauseit matters little whether tax policy analysts use one term or another
so long as the phenomena being described are understood clearly and
characterizedaccurately. Inaddition to the concessionthat we might just
aswell proceed without referring to HE any longer, this defense is
unpersuasive on its own terms.Risk is a concept thathas long been
carefully studied by economists (and others) whereas HE has not. Usingthe
terminologyassociated with risk and uncertainty invokes certain intuitions,
as well as particularmeasures, that aidin one's analysis.In contrast, HE
atmost invokes various conflicting indexes all of which fail to provide even
aremotely accurate measure or judent concerning risk, if that is really
the basis of concern.
—21-J$• HORIZONTAL um(X1TSIDE THE SOCIAL WFARE FRAMJORI
4.lNormative Significance of the Status Quo
Thissubsection considers attempts to accorddirectnormative
significance to the status quo distribution, independent of the welfare
consequences in the post—reform state. A major justificatory problem posed
by any such formulation concerns why the status quo is to be intrinsically
valued and thus support a preference against all changes in position when the
status quo was itself the product of countless such changes throughout
history. This can be seen as a definitional problem ——i.e.,what is to be
used as the status quo in evaluating changes, or, similarly, how isthe
statusquo to be defined in a constantly changing society.It should be
emphasized, however, that this definitional problem is closely connected with
the normative basis for deriving any preference for the status quo since the
very thing tobe defined is, from the HE perspective, to be given direct
normative significance •26
26. Plotnick (1981, p. 283 n.6) advocates usingthestatus quo —-despite
philosophicalobjections ——"onpranatic grounds [since) itmay not be too
bad.If, despitethe contrary arguments that canbeoffered, most persons
tacitly accept the fairness of the preredistributive rankings when making
judnents on redistributive equity,a useful measure of [horizontal] inequity
mustalso accept this ranking."First, redistributivejudgnents usually
reject the preredistributive situation ——almostby definition.Second, by
this analysis, violations of HE from past reforms are ignored. Similarly, if
—25—The issue is well illustrated by the previous example that involved
considering a reform(moving, say,from State Ato State B), followed by a
laterreform that had the effect of restoring the initial situation. For the
latter reform, the status quo is B, producing the effect of a double loss In
HE from changing, and then moving back again. A more extended example helps
make the point.Consider a parent raising two children.One child starts
our story with 10, the other with 8.The parent periodically has some
discretionary income that can be used to benefit the children ——by
purchasing books, sending then to summer camp, taking tham to the dentist,
and the like.As it turns out, the discretionary income usually becomes
available 1! at a time, and most relevant purchases are lumpy, also costing 1!
each. On the first occasion, the father decides to spend the 1! on the child
who started with 8, thinking that such treatment is more fair since that
child is then less well off and the resulting distribution is more equal that
way.Sometime later when 1!moreis available, it is spent on the other
child, for the same reasons.Thispattern continues over the years as
follows:
a reform were enacted over Flotnick's objections on HE grounds, even that
post—reform distribution would be given normative significance in evaluating
the next reform ——includingthe repeal of the reform just (inappropriately)
enacted!Finally, whatever norms provide the basis for any such tacit
acceptance of the fairness of the status quo should provide the foundation
for equity measures, as discussed later in this Section.
Plotnick (1981!, p. 12) discusses how different initial positions should be
selected for analyzing various policies.He concedes (1981!, n.15) "that
whatever the initial measure selected by the analyst, he or she is implicitly
assuming the initial ranking to be fair." The problevi, however, is that in
each of his examples a different initial position is selected, and thus the
set of implicit fairness assumptions are directly contradictory. He does not
explain how inconsistent normative assumptions can simultaneously be
maintained in analyzing a single normative concept.
—26—Child I Child II
10 8
10 12
1l 12 1 16
18 16
I doubt anyone would describe the parent's decision rule asremotely
inequitable. Yet the effect at each stage is a loss in HE by any reasonable
measure.
The most obvious response if one hopes to preserve a place for HE is to
describe this not as an ongoing sequence of actions but rather as a single
action: the adoption of a decision rule forthe period during which the
children are cared forby the parent.Thisrecharacterization essentially
treats the situation (10,8) as the status quo throughout. But how is this
definition tobe justified? Becausethe decisions were anticipated at the
outset? Would theHEmeasure then change if' it turns out that the parent
either did not anticipate the future discretionary income, or simply employed
a myopic decisionmaking process? Because there is one decisiormiaker in any
event? But then, if the parent dies and a relative takes over custody, and
ends up making a similar sequence of decisions for the same sorts ofreasons,
do we find an affront to HE that was not said to exist previously? Because
little time passes between the periods? In fact the duration was not
specified, and not that much time passes between many reforms.Finally,
wouldwe feel the samewayif the status quo, instead of being (10,8), were
(100,1)? Or if the status quo, regardless of the income levels, has arisen
as a result of theft? Or if one of the children was extremely sick and
-27-needed medical care for five periods in a row? Finally, if all these
problems were overcome, the question would then become one of determining
which point in the past decade, century, or era corresponds to the place of
(10, 8) in the above example.
These problems concerning the difficulty of defining the status quo are
hardly matters of detail. Rather, they suggest that one first must determine
why it is that some pre—existing (or never—existing) "stalus quo" is
important and then analyze what relationship such a hypothetical state bears
to the actually existing status quo. A to the latter concern, it seems
likely that the aner for virtually any starting point would be very
little.
The best fullback would be to rely on arguments that seek to portray the
status quo as the result of an intrinsically justified process.Thus, the
status quo can be operationally defined as that distribution which has
resulted from this process. This gambit, however, is subject to essentially
the same problems just described. First, there must be some prior status quo
from which that process began, again raising the definitional problem.
Second, in dealing with the never-ending sequence of changes that occur in
any society, one would have to isolate all those that violated the process
and presumably recompute what the world would have been like had those
changes never ocoured, modified by any desire to accord some respect to
actions that arguably were justified given the second best circumstances in
which they were made.27 Thus, the status quo as conventionally defined, and
27.Nozick (1971) is often referenced for such an argument. Yet his process
theory is applicable only if originalentitlements and all transfershave
—28—as traditionally used in measuring HE, would only by the most extreme of
repeated historical coincidence be even remotely relevant under this
intrinsic process approach.The appropriate cnparison would much more
closely resemble the comparison of the post—reform state with some externally
specified distribution ——orat least results that could be speculatively
derived therefrom ——thanit would resemble any notion of the status quo. It
would then raise all of the issues addressed in the next subsection.
Third, even if the external distribution from this process perspective
were specified, it is not clear hz violations of HE would be measured.
Arguably, all reforms would have to be prohibited (which apparently is
Nozick's(197k) position) ——anextreme approach criticized earlier [see note
5),andonein contradiction with prior attempts to develop indexes of HE.
Moreover, in asecond best world where such anabsolute constraint hadoften
been violated, itmight be thought appropriate to adopt reforms that made the
resultingdistribution closer to the ideal. But such an approach also has
little to do with traditional notions of HE. The status quo is now devalued;
reforms can increase HE.This final set of problems will be seen in the
following subsection to plague broader attempts to justify HE outside of the
traditional social welfare framework.
beenin accord with his justifications. If not, he supports rectification to
account for past injustice, and willingly notes that such reparations could
justifysubstantialgovernment action that disturbs the status quo
distribution.(19714, pp. 152—53, 230—31.) The argument in text suggests,
however, that most process approaches one can envision would be subject to
precisely these limitations in attempting to justify giving weight directly
tothe status quo distribution.
—29—I.2 Horizontal Ecuity and Distributions External to the Status Quo
There is a way to avoid some of the difficulties just described. Much of
the confusion arose from our attempt to give intrinsic significance to the
status aip itself.The final sequence of questions posed following the
illustration involving two cthildren ——statusquo distribution, how the
status quo was produced, and varying needs ——suggestthat it may not be the
status quo we care about after all, but rather some external distribution
that itself has some intrinsic justification; a pre—existing normatively
significant status quo would be one example of this more general class of
external distributions.Some authors discussing HE in the context of tax
reform in fact useastheir reference point not the status quo, but some
other distribution such as that existing if the ideal tax system were in
piaoe.28 Departures from the status quo would no longer be deemed relevant,
28.An importantalternative would be to specify the no—tax world asthe
externaldistribution.[See Brown (1983), King (1983, p. 100), Plotn.ick
(1982, p. 376).]
Their approaches raise the distinction sometimes made in the HE literature,
most notably by Feldstein (1976a), between taxdesignand tax reform.
Reform, which has been referred to throughout, defines the status quo as that
which exists prior to the change, which, subject to the numerous above
problems,admits of some definition,even if lacking in normative
significance.By contrast, design takes as the reference point not the
status quo Itself, buta hypothetical world Inwhich no tax exists.
Choosingthe perspective of design versus reform Isnot a matter thatshould
betaken lightly since the two definitions can lead to contradictory results
——i.e.,design A can have better HE thandesignB, yet reforming from B to A
can only diminish HE by the reform—oriented definition. Similarly, one would
not simultaneously advocate that, In the case of a "ref orin," the status quo
(in particular, characterized by the existing tax system) has great normative
—30—and some reforms could be seen as increasing HE.29
significance whereas in the case of greater change ——tax(re)design ——the
normative significance of the status quo would disappear altogether (to be
replaced by some other reference point).Choosing among such reference
points is not a simple matter of convenience, but rather requires deciding
among quite different implicit normative positions.
In addition, adopting the tax design approach requires determining whether it isintended that no taxes exist, no lawsexist, taxes and laws exist, butnot
the form oftax inquestion, or atleast not that form of the tax at that level ofgovernment, etc.Somepossibilitiesthat cometomind including
returningto the pre-.revolutionary days in the UnitedStates when the British
taxes were opposed as inequitable, to the Middle ages or much earlier, to
ancientcivilizations, when the first taxes existed, or alltheway back to
the state of nature, althoughimplicitsocialarrangementsin eventhe most
primativesocieties could easily be interpreted as including what we now
classifyastaxes andtransfersin a larger society. Moreover, it is hard to
understand why any of these alternative reference points would be
particularly relevant. Many of these states never existed. If they did, it
is often a long time in the past, when countless other relevant parameters
were different as well. This is just a special case of the previous problom
of the need to defend the status quo at some initial point. More important,
any of the choices suggested by the tax design way of thinking are purely
arbitrary in normative terms, except to the extent they refer to some
independently justified externalidea].world and the corresponding
distribution thereby implied, in which case the discussion in text would
apply.For example, if the purpose of taxation were to rectify existing
inequity, theno—tax world isthe direct subject of attack, not a baseline
f or normative judgment.
29. For example, it is not completely clear why Hettich claims that his index
Is an index of HE and not a measure of VE.His external reference
distribution is chosen based on preferences concerning progressIvity (1979,
pp. 700—06) and his index measures departures from that distribution.[See also Hettich (1983).]His argument that partial expansions of a
less—than—comprehensive tax base may rationally be rejected based on pursuit
of the goals of HE and VE(704) cansurely be supported based on VE
considerations alone. (His argument is a simple application of the theory of
secondbest.) In fact, his index registers a substantial loss in HE when
equalsare treatedperfectly equally,but unequals are taxedin proportions
thatdeviate from theoptimal distribution of the taxburden,which is
clearlya VE concern. If his measure were truly to capture yE, however, it
would measure VE directly rather than measuring departures from a
distribution derived in part based on VE considerations.Hettich's
conclusion (1979, p. 709; 1983, p. 422)that VE and HEcannot be separated in
making policy judgments is not a "result" of any analysis, but rather simply
a direct interpretation of his arbitrarily selected aggregrate equity index
that was not derived from any clear statement of the basis for or meaning of
VE and HE concerns.
—31—Yet any approach relying upon an external distribution is hard to
reconcile with the concept of HE as traditionally understood. The status quo
generally would be irrelevant; social welfare -—includingall equity
concerns -—wouldbe measured solely by reference to the final distribution;
the existence of a constant external reference point against which to judge
all situations allows it to be incorporated directly into the social welfare
function. In addition, there would be no particular reason to expect the
ideaofequal treatment to have special significance ——ifthe post—reform
state is not ideal, there would be no a priori implication following from the
fact that the shortcoming arose from unequal treatment rather than, for
example, equal treatment of unequals.30 It might well be an improvement if
two "ideal world equals" that were treated in a less than idea]. manner, and
unequally, were instead treated equally, by taking the average treatment that
both received, but gains from moving individuals closer together are already
encompassedin yE.31
Whileit is true that in general an index of HE such as that suggested in
30. One could imagine, for example, a caste system, which might entail giving
special weight to the extent individuals' incomes deviate from the average
incomes of other caste members ——independentof concern for the average
welfare of the caste. The arguments to follow would still be applicable.
31. It is rarely clear why upward deviations are deemed undesirable in the HE
context. With yE, this is the case only to the extent that others at lower
points in the income distribution are made worse off. In contrast, the HE
concept would attach independent jgy weight to gains regardless of their
adverse effects on others. Hettich (1983, p. 12O) is typical: "With regard
to[horizontal] equity, no cancellation occurs, of course. According to the
principle of equal treatment of equals, paying too little [tax] is as
undesirable as paying too much." Similarly, Plotnick (1982, p. 383 n.18)
simplyasserts that "[b]oth gains and losses of welfare indicate horizontal
inequities; they cannot offset each other."Apparently,no further
motivation or justification for this normative approach is thought necessary.
—32—subsection 2.1 (where the external distribution is substituted for the status
quo distribution) would be positively correlated with the degree to which a
statefell short of the external ideal, it would be more natural to measure
deviations in terms of the objectives used in generating the external
distribution. Moreover, even ifsuch an indexwere used as a proxy, such an
index would hardly be indicating a value to be traded off against optimal
achievnent of the objectives that generated the external distribution.
Rather, it indicates the degree to which these other stated goals have been
achieved. Finally, to the extent one's reference distribution was derived in
a second—best framework that balances a number of factors —-asis often the
case ——itwould be inappropriate to base a measure of inequity on deviations
from that distribution rather than from the unattainable first best (for the
usual second—best reasons). For all of these reasons, therefore, HE would be
a totally derivative concept, not an independent normative consideration. To
the extent HE departs from 8uch a role, it is not only outside of the
traditional social welfare framework, but inconsistent with more general
notions of optimally achieving any set of stated objectives.
In sum, the closer one gets to a plausible independent justification ——
regardlessof the strength of its normative appeal —-thefurther one moves
from any notion of HE as traditionally understood and measured.This
suggests that further pursuits of HE measurements along traditional lines are
misdirected.Instead, it seems appropriate to consider more carefully
various concepts of equity that appear to merit attention and develop
pragmatic measures tailored directly to those concepts.
—33 —5. ONLUSION
Focusing upon normative approaches rather than concrete examples, the
overall conclusion concernin€ HE can be seen as follows.Section 2
demonstrated that the very definition of HE seems inconsistent with attempted
applications and that more elaborate indexes often produce paradolical
results.Section 3focusedon the traditional social welfare framework,
where HE was seen to be a redundant or contradicted concept. Section k cast
serious doubt on whether the concept of HE could be based upon attempts to
attribute normative significance to the status quo or derived from other
intrinsically valued distributions. In either case, the command f or equal
treatment was seen to be a by-product of the optimization process, not an
independent factor to trade off against whatever normative principle is
represented by the external distribution, which might in some circumstances
call for other than equal treatment, however defined. The question at this
point must be whether the desire to capture our intuitive sense of justice
merely requires deriving a measure for HE far more complex than we previously
realized necessary, or whether the problem is more that we do not even know
what intuition we are attemtin to oature in the first place.
From a practical perspective, however, HE can be seen to have some uses
despite these eriticins; most have been noted previously although they are
not those generally emphasized in the literature.First, as suggested by
King (1980), Atkinson (1980), and Plotnick (198U, political advisors would
certainly care about HE.Much of Hettich (1979) is directed toward
—31—determining when political agreement may be possible.This of course is
true, since how people are treated is highly relevant to how they will
react.32It is a bit surprising that this justification for the concept
wouldbeoffered without further explanation amidst what appear to have been
intended as normative discussions.
Second, to the extent that equal treatment of equals is often implied by
the xn'ization of any quasi—concave objective function, unequal treatment
may indicate that the existing situation can be improved upon. For example,
in much of the tax reform debate, various arguments invoking HE are
essentially flags of wedges that create inefficiency or indications of the
appropriate relative inoane determinations in comparing individuals that are
necessary to determing the degree of inequality for application of VE norms.
Third, it is well known that violation of horizontal equity on a repeated
basis can have effects on incentives.33 Of course, this effect is just like
that resulting from the imposition of risk.Both interpretations of this
aspect require substantial further study.Independent of the effects on
32. t.breover, since the concept of equal treatment of equals has so much
appeal, the unequal treatment in itself may have intrinsic political
significance even if' it lacks intrinsic normative significance. People are
often quite attached to the status quo, regardless of the degree of justice
present in producing it. Independently, the cry of unequal treatment derives
much rhetorical power from its force in unrelated contexts, such as racial
di acimination.
33. Stiglitz (1982, p. 28 & n.21) suggests a concern that permitting unequal
treatment may make arbitrary discrimination favoring certain interest groups
more likely in Practice given imperfections in governmental institutions. He
is correct that this view Implies that analysis of HE such as that "contained
in Feldstein, Rosen and King may not be focusing on the critical issues"
since his argument, like those noted here in text, relates to determining the
likely effects of government action, not evaluating them.
—35—behavior, the simple imposition of risk (or increase in dispersion of the
income distribution) is generally undesirable, so we should be attentive to
unequal treatment to the extent it is connected to these effects. Finally,
Atkinson (1980) has noted that in attempting to measure the degree of
equality (yE)resultingfrom a reform, one canbemisled by examining the
post—reform averages for groups of pre-.reform equalstothe extent equals are
not treatedequally.
Theexistence of these reasons to payattentionto violations of HE may
explain the attention the concept has received.It shouldbernembered,
however, that these reasons have one thing in common: they are not reasons
why HE in itself is valued in any normative sense. Rather, each are reasons
why unequal treatment may provide information or at least clues as to the
actual effects of a given reform, whether sucheffects are tobe evaluated by
a maximizer of social welfare (who cares about risk, incentives, andyE),a
politician on the move, or anyone else using whatever criteria arejustified
inthose contexts.
Itwould be wrong for me to assert that this paper conclusively
demonstrates that HE as currently interpreted cannot be defended on direct
normative grounds. Such impossibility results are obviously infeasible in a
contextsuch as this.Itdoesseem fair to claim, however, that the existing
basisfor the study of HE, which has remained virtually unquestioned and
unexamined from the outset, is quite shaky indeed. Thus, to the extent HE as
now understood is to remain a central consideration, it would first be
appropriate to clearly articulate and defend some reasonable argument in
support of the concept.
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